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Economists have long favored an instrumental approach to money, 
highlighting the three functions that give it specific utility: a medium of 
exchange, a store of value, and a unit of account. however, as noted by 
akerlof and Shiller (2009), the third function has not been the subject 
of extensive analysis. Indeed, the first two functions constitute the core 
demand for money, in relation to income and interest rates, and the em-
phasis is often placed on the medium of exchange function. Money is 
thus considered a pure instrument created to facilitate the circulation of 
goods and services, which was hindered by the difficulties of bartering, 
in particular, due to the coincidence of wants problem.
Within this analytical framework, money—created by and for 
exchange—is associated with the idea of homo economicus, whose 
behavior is limited to maximizing his or her utility function. as money 
is used only to acquire goods or services or to store value, the rational 
homo economicus agent is only interested in his or her purchasing power. 
hence, money illusion does not exist. Defined as the failure to distinguish 
between the nominal and the real value of money, or as an inability to 
accurately take into account the change in money prices, money illusion 
is indeed manifested in irrational choices. 
Sacha Bourgeois-gironde is <<what is your position / e.g., profes-
sor?>> at aix-Marseille university, ceperc, and <<what is your posi-
tion?>> at Institut Jean-Nicod (ENS, EhESS<<what do ens and ehess 
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however, beginning in the early twentieth century, some economists, 
including notably John Maynard Keynes and Irving Fisher, emphasized 
the tendency of people to think of money in nominal, rather than real, 
terms. Fairly well accepted until the end of the 1960s, and used notably 
to justify the downward stickiness in nominal wages and the real effects 
of monetary policy, the money illusion hypothesis was nevertheless 
practically abandoned thereafter as economists broadly adhered to the 
monetarist school. Driven by the postulate of a rational maximizer agent, 
this new consensus was described by Tobin (1972) as “[a]n economic 
theorist can, of course, commit no greater crime than to assume money 
illusion,”<<page for quotation>> and was not challenged for a 
long time, even by Post Keynesians. Their negative attitude toward money 
illusion originated from the argument that Keynes was misinterpreted 
and did not see this illusion as important (Trevithick, 1975).
During the early 1990s, the interest in money illusion was renewed 
from an empirical standpoint and largely grew out of the influence of 
experimental psychology applied to economics, which focuses on money 
illusion as a cognitive bias separating agents from the homo economicus 
model. conceding that agents can suffer from money illusion is equiva-
lent to considering that they have bounded rationality, and seeking to 
cast light on this cognitive bias requires the unit of account function to 
be studied.
In practical terms, the fact that money serves as a unit of account means 
that agents think in money terms. contracts (labor or loan contracts, 
leases) include clauses labeled in money terms, company accounts are 
presented in money terms, taxes are paid with money, and so forth. In 
each of these cases, agents could adjust the nominal quantities so that 
the use of money as a unit of account would have no real effect. For in-
stance, they could plan for automatic adjustments in line with inflation, 
via indexation on the general level of prices, but this is generally not the 
case, as shown by Shiller et al. (1997). a plausible explanation could be 
that agents suffer from money illusion.
Our paper is aimed at understanding the economic and psychological 
reality of this phenomenon. In the first section, we review the changing 
status of money illusion within the field of economic thought. Oscillating 
between the temptation to prescribe what should be and the desire to make 
reality intelligible, economists have at times ignored money illusion due 
to the perfect rationality hypothesis while at other times acknowledg-
ing it, in particular in recent empirical studies<<cite any recent 
exaMpLe(s)?>> of various types. In the second section, we account 
for recent contributions of experimental economics and neuroeconomics 
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that prove particularly suited to understanding the psychological reality 
of this phenomenon at the level of individual agents. 
While psychological and neurobiological data, obtained with a view 
to understanding our monetary behavior, have thus far had a minimal 
impact on the analysis of the nature and role of money in economics, it 
is possible to isolate the neural mechanisms that explain some behavioral 
anomalies with regard to money. From a psychological and neurobio-
logical standpoint, money is complex in nature and the difficulty lies in 
successfully identifying a coherent or sufficiently structured mental and 
neural representation of money. a recent neuroscientific study of money 
illusion (Weber et al., 2009) shows that money illusion is attributable 
to the sensitivity of the brain’s reward circuit to the nominal frame of 
money due to its salience. In our view, if money illusion is the result 
of a neurobiologically anchored dissociation between the perception of 
money’s real value and that of its nominal value, it is more difficult to 
ignore it on a theoretical level and to define public policies that would 
dampen its effects on individuals. 
Money illusion in economics: from anathema to  
empirical evidence
The assumption of rational behavior joined with David hume’s assertion 
that “money is a veil,” with no specific utility except as an instrument for 
the exchange of commodities that are unlike money of direct significance 
for economic welfare, precludes any form of money illusion (Of Money, 
1752<<suppLy coMpLete inforMation for this cita-
tion for the reference List>>). In particular, labor supply 
depends on real, rather than nominal, wages.
These hypotheses, particularly those that describe how the labor mar-
ket works and postulate the negligible role played by money, were not 
questioned by the neoclassical economists.1 leontief (1936) specifies 
that money illusion violates the so-called homogeneity postulate of 
economic theory, which states that the demand and supply functions 
should be homogeneous of degree zero in all nominal prices (i.e., they 
should depend on relative prices and not on absolute or nominal prices). 
To resolve the problem of the subsequent indetermination of money 
prices and to integrate the quantity theory of money into the general 
equilibrium paradigm, Patinkin (1949, 1956) extends this reasoning to 
real balances and specifies that the absence of money illusion is verified 
1
 See Pigou (1941).
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when excess-demand functions for commodities solely depend on rela-
tive prices and real balances. concretely, the absence of money illusion 
enables the neutral effect of money to be demonstrated: a change in the 
quantity of money results in a proportional change in all money prices 
so the purchasing power of money is unchanged; therefore, agents do 
not modify their supply and demand for commodities.
Nevertheless, some economists, such as Fisher (despite being a quan-
titativist) and Keynes, consider that agents are in fact predisposed to 
money illusion and, as a consequence, do not accurately take inflation 
into account. 
Fisher defines money illusion as “the failure to perceive that the dollar, 
or any other unit of money, expands or shrinks in value”<<year and 
page for quotation>> attributable to the fact that money as a 
unit of account is fundamentally different from physical yardsticks, such 
as miles and kilos, in that it does not have an intrinsic value that is un-
changing over time (The Money Illusion, 1928<<suppLy coMpLete 
inforMation for this citation for the reference 
List>>). Because of this illusion, agents are unable to correctly take 
into account changes in prices, that is, to distinguish between a transac-
tion’s nominal value and its real value. hence, they make inappropriate 
decisions. Fisher attempts to demonstrate the empirical importance of 
money illusion on the basis of historical and statistical evidence from 
various countries. he considers money illusion to be a decisive factor in 
determining business cycle fluctuations.
In his General Theory (1936), Keynes emphasizes the effects of this 
illusion on workers’ behavior. he notes: “ordinary experience tells us, 
beyond doubt, that a situation where labor stipulates (within limits) for a 
money-wage rather than a real wage, so far from being a mere possibil-
ity, is the normal case. Whilst workers will usually resist a reduction of 
money-wages, it is not their practice to withdraw their labor whenever there 
is a rise in the price of wage-goods” (<<suppLy specific page(s) 
for quotation>> ch. 2, II<<what does “ii” stand for? 
VoLuMe ii of the collected worKs? suppLy coMpLete 
inforMation for Keynes 1936 generAl theory or col-
lected worKs for the reference List>>). 
In other words, workers are generally opposed to any reduction in nominal 
wages, whereas they accept more easily a reduction in their real wages 
due to inflation. The result is downward rigidity or stickiness in nominal 
wages, which Keynes uses as a pillar of his criticism of the neoclassical 
labor market theory. Whereas this theory implicitly assumes that workers 
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adjust their labor supply in function of every fluctuation of prices, Keynes 
observes that this is not actually the case and that the workers’ tendency 
to accept moderate decreases of their real wages can increase the volume 
of employment. Thus, there is no “labor market” in a traditional theoreti-
cal sense since supply depends on nominal wages and demand on real 
wages. Yet Keynes also considers the possibility that entrepreneurs can 
fall prey to money illusion, at least in the short term,2 and recognizes that 
the impact on employment of changes in money wages are complex and 
depend on the expectations they generate (ch. 19<<cLarify cita-
tion / see preVious query>>).
clearly, Keynes does not believe that workers’ money illusion, that 
is, their passivity in the event of moderate inflation, is sufficient to 
restore full employment, as the level of employment is more generally 
determined by the principle of effective demand for goods and services. 
however, he highlights that a money economy is first and foremost an 
economy in which agents count in money terms; hence, he rejects the 
neoclassical principle of dichotomy and underlies<<correct? or 
underLines Meant?>> the importance of the signals transmit-
ted by nominal amounts. he thus admits that agents can be subject to 
money illusion. however, he also justifies the resistance to a reduction 
in nominal wages by the fact that such a reduction is never generalized 
and thus implies a de facto relative reduction in real wages, whereas 
it is more difficult to resist a reduction in real wages resulting from 
inflation that affects all workers.3 Furthermore, Keynes asserts that “if 
wages were to be fixed in terms of some other commodity, e.g. wheat, it 
is improbable that they would continue to be sticky”<<suppLy page 
for quotation / see query in footnote 4>> and more 
precisely, he links this stickiness to money’s specific properties.4 Because 
“[m]oney in its significant attributes is, above all, a subtle device for 
linking the present to the future”<<suppLy page for quota-
tion / see query in footnote 5>> and because this future 
is uncertain and impossible to forecast in the long term using a rational 
2
 “For a time at least, rising prices may delude entrepreneurs into increasing em-
ployment beyond the level which maximizes their individual profits measured in terms 
of the product” (ibid., ch. 20<<suppLy page for quote rather than 
chapter nuMber>>, III, note 1.<<(ibid wouLd be 1936 generaL 
theory, but if this is VoLuMe iii, that is a different subtitLe 
and perhaps a different year / cLarify source and suppLy 
coMpLete inforMation for the reference List (VoLuMe iii 
of the coLLected worKs Meant?>>)
3
 Ibid., chapter 2, III.<<cLarify source / see query at note 2>>
4
 Ibid., chapter 17, III.<<cLarify source / see query at note 2>>
08 bourgeois-gironde.indd   333 12/19/2011   2:48:45 AM
334 JOURNAL  OF  POST  KEYNESIAN  ECONOMICS 
approach, we consider it obvious that money illusion results implicitly 
from factors that, according to Keynes, nevertheless enable agents to 
make decisions with an impact on the future.5 The primary factor lies 
in our animal spirits: “it is our innate urge to activity which makes the 
wheels go round, our rational selves choosing between the alternatives 
as best we are able, calculating where we can, but often falling back for 
our motive on whim or sentiment or chance” (<<suppLy specific 
page(s) for quotation>>ibid., ch. 12, VII<<what does 
“Vii” stand for? VoLuMe Vii of the collected worKs? 
suppLy coMpLete inforMation for this VoLuMe for 
the reference List (ibid wouLd be for 1936 generaL 
theory as cited at beginning of preVious para-
graph>>). Indeed, akerlof and Shiller (2009) classify money illusion 
as an aspect of the five animal spirits that caused the 2008<<2007–2009? 
or “caused the recent...”?>> financial crisis, alongside confi-
dence, fairness, temptation toward corrupt and antisocial behavior, and 
changing stories about the economy. 
In the 1960s, most economists agree with the Keynesian hypothesis of 
money illusion among workers, without inquiring into its basis, and use 
it to explain the existence of the Phillips curve, which according Tobin 
(1967), is “in a sense a reincarnation in dynamic guise of the original 
Keynesian idea of ‘money illusion’ in the supply of labor. The Phillips 
curve says that increases in money wages–and more generally, other mon-
ey incomes–are in some significant degree prized for themselves, even 
if they do not result in equivalent gains in real incomes.”<<page for 
quotation>> Thus, this illusion justifies the existence of a negative 
relationship between inflation and unemployment: rising prices leads to 
declining real wages, and thus to a reduction in unemployment.
however, with the rise of the monetarist school in the late 1960s, this 
trade-off disappeared since the money illusion hypothesis, in particular 
<<as?>> applied to workers, was abandoned by most economists. This 
choice was not based on empirical evidence that money illusion did not 
exist, but rather on the prevalent model of rational behavior. Indeed, if 
workers are rational and maximize their expected utility, they anticipate 
future inflation when negotiating their nominal wages and cannot be 
subject to money illusion. admittedly, Friedman (1968) concedes that 
workers may inaccurately forecast inflation in the short term, and that 
if they underestimate the latter<<specify “the Latter”>>, the 
decline in real wages can reduce unemployment. The Phillips curve 
5
 Ibid., chapter 21, I.<<cLarify source / see query at note 2>>
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(enhanced with adaptive anticipations) thus reappears but only for the 
short term, after which the illusion dissipates and agents correct their 
errors. In the long term, workers do not make mistakes in their expecta-
tions; hence, money is neutral. In the short term, controlling the quantity 
of money ensures the absence of inflation (or at a low level), and thus 
maintains unemployment at its natural level.
The rational expectations revolution in the late 1970s discredited the 
hypothesis of money illusion, and its implications, from economics for 
a long time. Since rational individuals do not exhibit illusions or commit 
errors, there is nothing to study and the trade-off between inflation and 
unemployment disappeared, even in the short term. lucas (1973) never-
theless conceded that money has a real but temporary impact on output, 
not because of money illusion strictly speaking, but due to a confusion 
among producers between a general rise in the price level attributable to 
expansionist monetary policy and an increase in the relative price of the 
goods they produce. hence, money is neutral unless monetary authorities 
mislead agents with regard to the level of inflation and the credibility of 
monetary policy becomes a crucial stake. Nor is this absence of money 
illusion challenged by overlapping generations models that justify the 
existence of money by introducing liquidity constraints à la Diamond 
(1965) or by money search models à la Kiyotaki and Wright (1989). 
Money search models focus on the medium of exchange function of 
money, except in some models that show that inflation or a money-unit 
change could create a price illusion and have a favorable impact on wel-
fare under certain conditions.6 Even Post Keynesian critiques about the 
neutrality of money relied on the endogeneity of money (Moore 1988) or 
on lags in adjustments (Trevithick, 1975), rather than on money illusion, 
an hypothesis that, according to Davidson (1999<<1999a or 1999b? 
see query in reference List>>), is not required to reject the 
homogeneity postulate.7
however, in the past two decades, this consensus has largely disap-
peared. Some economists reconsider the relevance of money illusion 
partly because the stickiness of nominal wages and prices seem to be an 
important phenomenon and money illusion provides an explanation to 
this nominal inertia in addition to other factors such as menu costs or ef-
ficiency wages. Moreover, a lot of empirical or quasi-empirical evidence 
seems to support the occurrence of money illusion. 
6
 See Besancenot et al. (2000) and Diamond (1993).
7
 See Wray (1992)<<not in reference List>> for a survey of these 
approaches.
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The downward stickiness of nominal wages is revealed either at an 
aggregate level, with the help of quantitative data, or at an individual 
level, based on qualitative surveys.8 using panel data from several 
Western countries, card and hyslop (1997) and Kahn (1997) showed 
that the distributions of changes in nominal wages are asymmetrical 
around zero. Fortin (1996) studied 1,149 large non-cost-of-living adjust-
ment (non-cOla) union wages in canada from 1992 to 1994 during a 
severe recession characterized by weak inflation (1.2 percent) and high 
unemployment (11 percent). his results underscore the small proportion 
of wage settlements involving wage cuts (5.7 percent), whereas nearly 
half of them froze wages (47 percent). 
Qualitative surveys are used to ask agents directly about this nominal 
wage rigidity. Their results reveal, first, that resistance to a reduction in 
wages is frequent, even among managers, and second, that money illu-
sion is an important factor of this resistance. Thus, the opinion surveys 
of canadian households carried out by Kahneman et al. (1986) show that 
rules of fairness can play a role in wage stickiness, as suggested previ-
ously by akerlof (1979) and Solow (1980). These rules are influenced 
by a type of money illusion considered a framing effect, as it reflects 
agents’ sensitivity to the nominal framework.9 This illusion is clearly 
visible in the different answers to two questions that are identical in 
real terms: 62 percent of those surveyed believe that in a context of high 
unemployment and no inflation, it would be unfair for a struggling firm 
to cut wages by 7 percent, whereas 78 percent think that in a similar 
context of unemployment but with inflation of 12 percent, a 5 percent 
rise in wages would be acceptable. 
Surveys of managers in another context confirm the influence of money 
illusion linked to a certain conception of fairness in wage stickiness. 
The results of a survey carried out by Blinder and choi (1990), aimed at 
human resource managers (or equivalent) in 19 u.S. firms indicate that 
47 percent of those surveyed consider it more equitable that real wages 
should be reduced due to inflation outstripping the increase in nominal 
wages, rather than a reduction in nominal wages in a zero-inflation con-
text. Furthermore, 59 percent of these managers believe that workers share 
this conviction. When asked why, they suggest a psychological difference 
between taking away and not giving, rather than a poor understanding 
of real wages. These results are confirmed by interviews carried out by 
Bewley (1999) in connecticut<<how is “in connecticut” 
8
 See akerlof (2002) and akerlof and Shiller (2009).
9
 See Kahneman and Tversky (1981).
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MeaningfuL? be More specific, or suggest deLet-
ing those words>>, which showed that managers only reduce 
nominal wages as a last resort, citing ethical reasons for this choice. 
last, in a large sample of Swedish human resource managers surveyed 
by agell and Bennmarker (2007), most of the respondents (94 percent) 
stated that in a context of high unemployment and no inflation, their 
workers would not accept a 5 percent cut in wages, whereas in the same 
circumstances but with an inflation rate of 10 percent, just half of the 
respondents believed that their workers would refuse a mere 5 percent 
increase in wages. 
The same type of reluctance can play a role in price stickiness. Thus, a 
survey by Blinder (1994) on price adjustments showed that rigid prices 
are the norm: 65 percent of firms surveyed do not revise their prices or 
do so only once or twice a year. Moreover, in the ranking of 12 pos-
sible motivations for this rigidity, including various justifications drawn 
from economic theory, the leading reason cited is coordination failure 
(mentioned by 60 percent of respondents), 50 percent of the firms cite 
implicit contracts, defined as tacit agreements for price stability, perhaps 
out of “honesty” to the client, and 36 percent state that prices are fixed 
by explicit contracts. These findings are confirmed by a similar study 
in the eurozone, wherein the majority of firms surveyed change their 
prices only once a year, and implicit or explicit contracts are cited as 
the main factors for this rigidity (Fabiani et al., 2007). Money illusion 
clearly plays a role here in connection with considerations of ethics or 
fairness, as suggested by Okun (1981), in the psychological weight of 
these contracts.10 according to Tyran (2007), entrepreneurs’ sensitivity 
to money illusion may also result in an aversion to nominal losses, which 
would justify downward stickiness of prices, as price cuts inevitably 
reduce profits. 
Other studies show that a pure nominal shock as the euro introduction 
in January 2002 triggered significant real effects <<“shocK such 
as the euro introduction...”? otherwise this is 
uncLear>>, thus discrediting the absence of the money illusion hy-
pothesis. For instance, the European central Bank observed in its 2002 
annual report that the monthly change in prices in restaurants and cafes 
in the eurozone in January 2002 was more than three times as high as 
the average for the month of January over the period 1996–2001, and 
clearly higher than in Eu countries that did not adopt the euro. These 
observations also apply to most other services.
10
 See also Blinder et al. (1998).
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The changeover to the euro, viewed as a natural experimental in chang-
ing the nominal framework, also had consequences for various types of 
donations. Notably, Kooreman et al. (2004) showed that in 2000 and 
2001, the growth in donations to a specific charity in the Netherlands 
(2.2 percent and 1.3 percent, respectively) was lower than inflation, 
whereas in 2002, donations substantially outpaced inflation (they rose 
11.1 percent). Yet this sharp increase cannot be attributed to a corre-
sponding rise in incomes, as the change in the real disposable income 
was virtually zero in 2002, nor can it be explained by a specific event. 
according to Kooreman et al., this effect is thus an example of money 
illusion. More specifically, people saved on cognitive effort by dividing 
previous guilder amounts by 2 rather than applying the exact guilder/euro 
conversion rate of 2.20371, or preferred to round off their contribution 
up to the nearest 0.50 euro coin instead of giving the exact equivalent of 
a guilder, which would have required using several coins.
cannon and cipriani (2006) highlight similar effects of the euro in-
troduction on church giving. Thus, in 2002, these donations grew by 
11 percent in nominal terms in Italy, for gDP (gross domestic product) 
growth of 3 percent, and 13 percent in Ireland, for gDP growth of 10 per-
cent. This implies stronger money illusion in Italy than in Ireland. These 
divergences can be attributed to different types of bounded rationality as-
sociated with the differences in the euro exchange rates: in every country, 
except Ireland, the conversion to the euro led to lower numbers<<of 
what?>>. So, the anchoring effect should result in greater spending 
everywhere, with lower spending only in Ireland. The marked increase 
in giving<<cLarify / church donations?>> in Italy and 
the continued use of the lira as a unit of account appear to support this 
type of effect. however, in Ireland, there was an increase in donations, 
but to a weaker degree than in Italy compared to income growth. This 
result provides weak support for a difference assessment effect at play 
in Ireland: when all nominal values increase proportionately, spending 
rises. last, as a large portion of giving is done in round figures, banknotes 
and coins<<preVious part of sentence uncLear / “...
in round figures, banKnotes and coins”? Meaning 
banKnotes and coins are the figures (e.g., dona-
tions)?>>, these results are also partly attributable to rounding and 
threshold effects.
Showing that people gave more to charities in different countries after 
the changeover to the euro, these behavioral studies shed light on the 
impact of nominal changes on consumption expenditures that Keynes 
suggested it would depend<<“which Keynes suggested 
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wouLd depend...”?>> on expectations in chapter 19 of his General 
Theory. These empirical findings are supported by various stylized facts. 
For instance, contracts seldom include indexation clauses to link future 
payments (debt, wages, rents, etc.) to the consumer price index or any 
other inflation index, and most government and corporate bonds are not 
inflation-indexed. This frequent absence of indexation is evidence that 
agents prefer to stipulate their rights and obligations in nominal terms. 
Ignoring the rate of inflation may be a convenient rule of thumb when 
inflation is low and stable but the real value of currencies has proven 
unstable historically. Thus, christofides and Peng (2006) note that in 
canada, from 1976 to 2000, across periods of high and weak inflation 
and varying uncertainty in the nominal and real value of money, only 
19 percent of labor contracts in a large sample included an indexation 
clause, and when present, such clauses were generally incomplete, 
taking effect only above a certain inflation level, for instance. accord-
ing to Shiller et al. (1997), this resistance or indifference to indexation 
is widespread worldwide, even in countries such as Turkey that have 
experienced high and variable inflation. They note a few exceptions in 
periods of very high inflation, such as chile, which implemented in 1980 
an abstract unit of account (Unidad de Fomento, or uF), defined as the 
amount of pesos needed to buy the cost-of-living bundle. Since then, all 
forward contracts including future payments are stated in uFs and paid 
in pesos depending on the uF’s value, which is published daily. It is dif-
ficult to explain why this reform has been so easily accepted, and also 
why it has not been adopted in any other country. a survey carried out 
by the authors<<cLarify / shiLLer et aL.? incLude cite 
for “surVey” (and inforMation for the reference 
List if not the 1997 reference aLready incLuded>> 
of fairly educated individuals<<restate this? the surVey 
was not about “fairLy educated indiViduaLs”?>> in 
the united States and Turkey highlights that money illusion is, on the 
one hand, an important factor behind this resistance to indexation, and 
on the other hand, a complex phenomenon reinforced by perception 
errors, such as underestimating the potential uncertainty of inflation or 
the effects of inflation, which is often considered as an insidious disease 
that harms virtually everyone rather than causing arbitrary redistribution 
from creditors to debtors. 
Moreover, money illusion is a widespread phenomenon in society, given 
the frequent confusion between real and nominal value in political dis-
cussions, societal debates, or media coverage (akerlof and Shiller, 2009; 
Shafir et al., 1997). Even stock market investors, while<<“whose”? 
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“for whoM”?>> the stakes are obviously very high, seem to suffer 
from a particular form of money illusion, discounting real cash flows 
at nominal discount rates as suggested by Modigliani and cohn (1979). 
Indeed, recent time-series studies show that real indicators, such as stock 
dividend and earnings yields (the inverse of the price/earning ratio) are 
highly correlated with nominal bond yields (asness, 2000; Sharpe, 
2002). according to Boucher (2006) and campbell and Vuolteenaho 
(2003<<2004 in reference List>>), money illusion could also 
explain the negative correlation between inflation and stock valuation. 
cohen et al. (2005) also support this hypothesis when distinguishing 
money illusion from changing attitudes of investors toward risk using the 
Sharpe–lintner<<citation needed? / add reference for 
sharpe–Lintner?>> capital asset pricing model. Furthermore, pro-
fessionals in the financial sector or prestigious financial institutions such 
as the u.S. Federal reserve contribute to spreading this type of confusion 
as seen with the success of the “Fed model” (asness, 2003). Indeed, this 
equity valuation model, which alan greenspan implicitly referred to in a 
speech in 1997<<add reference (titLe, speech to what 
institution, Month/day, urL if aVaiLabLe onLine>>, 
compares a real indicator (the earning yield on shares) to a nominal indi-
cator (the yield on a 10-year Treasury note). When the first one is higher 
(lower) than the second, stocks are supposed<<supposedLy?>> 
overvalued (undervalued). Despite being subject to money illusion, this 
model rapidly gained popularity as a means to<<of?>> assessing the 
overall valuation of the stock market, although the Fed never acknowl-
edged it officially. Money illusion is also invoked to explain speculative 
bubbles on real estate or financial markets. according to haight (2007), 
the recent housing price bubble in the united States was supported by 
a long period of low inflation that create an environment conducive to 
predatory lending since home buyers watch the nominal rather than real 
rate and more particularly monthly payment ratio. his view that money 
illusion can be stabilizing in the presence of moderate rather than zero 
(or very low) inflation contrasts with those of akerlof and Schiller 
(2009) and Bell and Quiggin (2006), who argued that money illusion 
associated with lower nominal rates played a role in promoting higher 
gearing<<word as Meant?>> and thus greater financial risks. 
hence, behavioral findings on money illusion might be relevant to provide 
microeconomic foundations to some bubble theories, such as those of 
<<first naMe>>Minsky and <<first naMe>>Kindleberger. 
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the psychology of money illusion: cognitive bias and  
neural correlates
Experimental economics casts light on the empirical reality of money 
illusion by trying to show its existence at an individual level as a cogni-
tive bias consisting<<that exists?>> in the confusion between real 
and nominal values. With this perspective in mind, Shafir et al. (1997) 
carried out an extensive survey, covering wages, transactions, and con-
tracts, which proves that agents can fall prey to non-negligible money 
illusion in these various contexts. Shafir et al. show in particular that the 
majority of individuals in their survey think in nominal, rather than real, 
terms when asked to compare certain situations; for example, to deter-
mine whom among characters adam, Ben, or carl made the best deal 
in selling a house purchased for $200,000 at different prices in different 
inflationary environments. Indeed, 53 percent of the subjects considered 
that adam earned the least money, even though he in fact earned the most 
in real terms (+2.67 percent) but the least in nominal terms (–23 percent). 
conversely, 48 percent believe that carl made the best deal, while in fact 
he lost the most money in real terms (–1.67 percent) but earned the most 
in nominal terms (+23 percent). In addition, most of these participants 
expected that other people would also be subject to money illusion. Shafir 
et al. analyze this strong money illusion effect as a framing effect reflect-
ing agents’ preference for the nominal framework given its salience and 
easiness to process, even though they may also grasp the real framework. 
however, they observe that the favored cognitive framework may vary 
depending on the context and the decision-maker’s experience, and that 
in most cases, agents mix the nominal and real frames, at least partially. 
In particular, it would appear that real prices are calculated and taken into 
account by agents when it becomes crucial to keep track of them, as dur-
ing periods of hyperinflation or for long-term contracts. The conclusions 
of Shafir et al. are notably supported by the findings of Fehr and Tyran 
(2001, 2007, 2008), who show that subjects in their price-setting game 
experiments are sensitive to a certain degree of money illusion once they 
are shown gains expressed in nominal, rather than real, terms.
The existence of the phenomenon of money illusion at the individual 
level suggests that economists might do well to understand the psycho-
logical functioning of this cognitive bias. however, this multidisciplinary 
approach is probably limited by the fact that until now, psychological 
and neurobiological data, obtained with a view to understanding our 
money-related behavior, have had a very low impact on the analysis 
and modeling of the nature and role of money in economics. Yet the 
08 bourgeois-gironde.indd   341 12/19/2011   2:48:45 AM
342 JOURNAL  OF  POST  KEYNESIAN  ECONOMICS 
question is to know whether this data can have an impact on economic 
theory. Economists both well versed in economic theory and updating 
their knowledge<< “and in updating...”? but not sure i un-
derstand / possibLe to cLarify?>> about rapidly evolving 
findings in cognitive neuroscience can emit the most informed answers 
to this question. In particular, they have to evaluate the support neurosci-
ence can provide to reject or admit some behavioral hypotheses, such as 
that of Davidson (2010)<<not in reference List>>, who points 
out that a recent functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMrI) study 
“provides strong support for the Post Keynesian view that the ergodic 
axiom must be rejected if one is to understand decision making in a 
modern money-using entrepreneurial economic system”<<daVidson 
quote? suppLy page>> by demonstrating that decision making 
under ambiguity (uncertainty with unknown probabilities à la Keynes) 
and risk (uncertainty with known probabilities) are supported by distinct 
brain mechanisms.11 In a less systematic fashion, economic psychol-
ogy studies tend more toward highlighting a variety of factors that can 
influence a phenomenon such as money illusion, rather than revealing a 
few basic and shared ingredients of our mental representation of money. 
For instance, using the experimental protocol proposed by Shafir et al. 
(1997), a study by Przybyszewski and Tyszka (2007) shows that money 
illusion is affected by an individual’s emotional attachment to a given 
currency. Prices expressed in a currency that triggers a stronger positive 
affective reaction are perceived as higher than equivalent prices expressed 
in a different currency with a more negative emotional connotation. We 
can suppose that money has symbolic dimensions that go beyond its 
instrumental properties as a medium of exchange, a unit of account, and 
a store of value. This emotional or symbolic value of money interferes 
with its purely instrumental value; the former adds or subtracts from 
the latter depending on the emotional valence of the money stimulus in 
question. however, the problem lies in knowing whether these psycho-
logical factors are purely contingent and must, due to their irregularity, 
be stripped out of economic theorization of money, or, conversely, if 
the psychological reality of money is sufficiently stable to provide an 
explanation for a phenomenon such as money illusion that economic 
analysis cannot entirely ignore.
cognitive sciences have investigated the emotional and symbolic as-
pects, on the one side, and the instrumental value of money, on the other 
side, formulating different hypotheses on how these two dimensions 
11
 See huettel et al. (2006).
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articulate. We suggest the following hypothesis: money illusion is an 
anomaly rooted in an imbalance between these two dimensions, with one 
systematically taking the upper hand. as shown by Shafir et al. (1997), 
most subjects juxtapose two representations (one nominal and the other 
real), which may replicate the dichotomy between money’s emotional 
connections and its instrumental dimension. however, the predominance 
of the illusion lies in the difficulty in inhibiting the nominal representa-
tion or frame that spontaneously comes to mind. It is as if two systems 
for understanding money stimuli coexisted in individuals’ minds, with 
no systematic underlying representation.
It is hard to envisage a hierarchy between an instrumental conception 
of money and a more instinctive one. The success of money throughout 
history may have been favored by the potentially addictive hold it can 
exert on the human species. conversely, for a given object to be able to 
fulfill certain desires or impulses, the subject may have to lucidly recog-
nize certain functions or potential uses that would be the actual source 
of motivation. In the distinction between “money as drug” and “money 
as tool” established in cognitive science by lea and Webley (2005), 
“money as drug” has been more largely explored in behavioral and 
neuroeconomic studies. however, lea and Webley’s synthetic approach 
provides theoretical elements for an analysis of the relation between these 
two dimensions of money, at the intersection of which money illusion 
may lie as this approach does not necessarily call for mutually exclusive 
alternatives. Our attitudes toward money can alternate between various 
cognitive and affective poles. People’s oscillations between these two 
poles imply that determinate solutions of general equilibrium models 
are unlikely to be valid models of actual behavior. The “irrationality” of 
financial bubbles may also be tracked back to unpredictable changes in 
how people value assets due to the fact they have no firm cognitive basis 
upon which hold a particular valuation with certainty. Modern behavioral 
economists rely on psychological models like the opposition between 
so-called System 1 affective and automatic mental processes and Sys-
tem 2 cognitive and analytic processes, as in, for example, Kahneman 
(2003). But we should not conceal a, rarely made explicit, genealogy 
stemming back to Keynes’s classical opposition between calculation and 
sentiment.12 Money illusion may be viewed as a difficulty in considering 
in a lucid and rational way the nominal value of a money stimulus, hence 
as the correlative difficulty in rationally considering the real, and thus 
instrumental, value that corresponds to the nominal value. 
12
 See the passage quoted earlier.<<cLarify / what, where?>>
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To apply psychological terminology used to explain cognitive biases 
(e.g., framing effects), nominal representations of prices, due to their 
salience, require a lower cognitive processing cost than processing real 
values: nominal values form “System 1” representations that do not 
automatically translate into “System 2” (i.e., rational) representations 
(see Kahneman, 2003). System 1 representations have an immediate 
emotional impact and must be blocked in order to realize the cognitive 
bias resulting from their processing. In a forward-looking article on 
research programs that could fall within the scope of neuroeconomics, 
camerer et al. (2005) highlighted the hedonic rather than instrumental 
relationship that people generally have with money: “People value money 
without carefully computing what they plan to buy with it.”<<page 
for quote>> Money’s utility is more linked to an experience or a 
direct sensation of pleasure than to an assessment of the goods that the 
agent can acquire therewith. For instance, the authors consider the phe-
nomenon of prepaid vacations to be a particular type of money illusion, 
whereby people tend to enjoy their trip more if they no longer have to 
worry about paying for it. according to them<<caMerer et aL.?>>, 
neuroeconomics can provide evidence for these behavioral hypotheses 
insofar as it reveals brain activity linked to pleasure or relief at making 
these payments, which are disconnected from the actual consumption 
that they make possible.
Neuroscientists have hypothesized the existence of a single neural re-
ward representation, encompassing money reward, but also other types 
of reward. Thus, the concept of “common neural currency,” put forth by 
Montague and Berns (2002), refers to the similarity between brain activity 
observed for a range of stimuli, including notably money rewards, but 
also food, sexual, or social rewards (building up one’s good reputation is 
an example of a social reward). The neural model proposed by Montague 
and Berns is based on the assumption that the common responses to 
various types of stimuli observed in the orbitofrontal and striatal circuits 
are derived from the conversion of disparate future rewards into a sort 
of uniform “internal currency.” admittedly, there is no reason to think, 
a priori, that money is a specific reward in terms of the brain activity it 
can trigger in an individual, yet most recent neuroeconomic studies have 
merely cast light on the motivational aspects of money, either intention-
ally or incidentally (i.e.,<<e.g.?>> when rewarding the performance 
of subjects in an experiment). Money is thus processed by the brain’s 
reward circuit in a fairly similar way to primary biological stimulants 
such as food or sex (De Quervain et al., 2004), but it can also exert an 
unconscious motivation for behavior (Pessiglione et al., 2007). 
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a more specific study of the neural substrates of money illusion has 
been proposed by Weber et al. (2009). Weber et al. used fMrI technol-
ogy in order to observe the cerebral mechanisms potentially involved 
in money illusion as expressed by an individual. Participants in their 
experiment were subject to two distinct experimental conditions. In both 
conditions, the economic structure was identical in real terms, but varied 
in nominal terms. The subjects obtained monetary units by carrying out 
an incidental task. This income was not paid in the form of money, but 
rather in purchasing power that could be spent on a relatively broad, 
but fixed, catalog of products. The catalogs for the two conditions were 
identical except that all of the prices were 50 percent higher in one of the 
two (labeled the “high price condition”). The difference between the two 
conditions was created as follows: for all income received by the subjects 
after accomplishing the incidental task and used to purchase products 
in the “low price condition,” the experimenters set a level of income 
exactly 50 percent higher that could be used to acquire products in the 
high price condition, for prices also 50 percent higher. The real value of 
the products was thus unchanged, with only the nominal value (or prices 
and corresponding income) varying between the two conditions.
The hypothetical process of Weber et al. (ibid.) consists of inquiring 
whether there is an observable dissociated effect on the brain circuits 
typically involved in processing and assessing rewards caused by the 
nominal and real values of the income acquired and spent during the 
experiment. The reward circuit plays a crucial role in learning and de-
cision making. Thus, the question is whether the two distinct nominal 
frames given for a single real economic structure (i.e., the constant rela-
tion between subjects’ income and the prices of products in the catalog) 
trigger different effects within these brain circuits. as the real structure 
is fixed, Weber et al. hypothesized that any modification in brain activ-
ity between the two conditions would be attributable to the change in 
the nominal framework. The accuracy of this hypothesis is surely open 
for discussion, or at least the robustness of the conclusions anticipated 
through its formulation, because we can imagine that a similar experi-
ment manipulating the real economic structure while maintaining the 
nominal value would also produce differentiated brain activity, which 
would not suggest any sort of illusion, but instead that decision-making 
or assessment processes are rooted in reality. In the terms of Weber et 
al., the absence of money illusion should in principle be reflected in an 
absence of differentiated brain activity in the processing of value linked 
to this purely nominal change.
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however, it is clear that interpreting differences in brain activity ob-
served in this experimental framework in terms of money illusion in the 
narrow sense is overly deterministic. This interpretation is nevertheless 
favored by the fact that the neurobiological observations are limited to 
the reward circuit, on the one hand, and by the correlation of these neu-
ral activities with independent behavioral results on a replication of the 
experiment initially run by Shafir, Tversky and Diamond<<cLarify / 
shafir, diaMond, and tVersKy 1997 Meant?>>, on 
the other hand. For the former, it may appear probable, or even tauto-
logical, that a change in brain activity linked to reward corresponds to 
a differentiated assessment of the value of money stimuli between the 
two experimental conditions in question. Yet if the real value does not 
change, the subjects are suffering from money illusion. however, what 
this reasoning still leaves undetermined is the cause of a specific impact 
of nominal frames on the reward circuit and, moreover, the reasons why 
this cerebral impact of nominal frames is such that it prevents the real 
economic structure from being taken into account.
Weber et al. (2009) highlight that one of the crucial areas of the brain’s 
reward circuit, the ventromedial prefrontal cortex, which is associated 
with the assessment and anticipation of goods, is subject to money illu-
sion, as defined by the researchers in this experiment. activity observed 
in this area of the brain was much higher in the high price condition than 
in the low price condition. These observations suggest that money illusion 
has specific biological anchoring. They point to money illusion not just 
as a behavioral anomaly visible on an individual level, but especially—
more radically—as an infra-individual neurobiological phenomenon. 
This result could be related to De Martino et al.’s (2006) investigation 
of the neurobiology of framing effects. Money illusion is an instance 
of a framing effect in the sense that the format in which real monetary 
transactions are presented has an incidence on their evaluation. Nominal 
formats are most certainly frames that involve a higher activity of the 
neural emotional system, as De Martino et al. find that the framing ef-
fect was specifically associated with amygdala activity. By contrast, they 
show that higher orbitofrontal and prefrontal neural activities, which are 
typically connected with a cognitive appraisal of a situation, predict a 
reduced susceptibility to the framing effect. This dual account of neural 
activities underpinning the money illusion connects its experimental 
investigation to well-known theoretical frameworks in psychology and 
behavioral economics.
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conclusion
recent research about money illusion essentially presents empirical 
evidence based on quantitative data or qualitative surveys, supported by 
stylized facts. In the absence of a theoretical basis, experimental econom-
ics contributes to a behavioral explanation for money illusion that reveals 
agents’ preferences and the fact that it results from the use of various 
heuristics (the framing effect, anchoring effect, etc.).
Economists should be sensitive to psychological and even biological 
explanations of this prevalent bias. The purely instrumental approach to 
money used in standard economic theory seems to be discredited by a 
neurobiological study that confirms a behavioral reality, namely, that a 
purely nominal change in a purchasing situation has a specific impact 
on an area of the brain’s reward circuit, which plays a key role in deci-
sion making. This biological fact would be a physical demonstration 
of Keynes’s “animal spirits.” recognizing the reality of this hedonic or 
emotional dimension of money, which lies outside the scope of homo 
economicus, has substantial theoretical and practical implications. 
This new set of data supports the idea, based on numerous anthropo-
logical, historical, and sociological studies, that money does not belong 
entirely to the trading sphere of human activity. The hypothesis that 
money retains properties inherited from primitive sociological structures 
warrants further investigation by economists, in particular the fact that 
money’s archaic nature is visible through money illusion. More gener-
ally, economists may be invited through the positive recognition of this 
set of data to adapt their theories rather than expecting that this bias can 
be eliminated by fostering acquaintance of the public with their own 
normative theories.
In addition, these findings appear to place money illusion outside one’s 
voluntary control and discard the possibility of an efficient institutional 
design to eliminate it. One could assert that the existence of a biologi-
cal explanation for money illusion makes it more difficult, a priori, to 
implement policies aimed at eliminating this anomaly in society. Broadly 
speaking, if money illusion were only a distortion in reasoning, that is, 
a “simple” cognitive bias resulting in a behavioral anomaly, the preva-
lence of this bias could be reduced thanks to socioeconomic behavioral 
reform programs, along the lines of proposals put forth by the “liberal 
paternalism” (Sunstein and Thaler, 2003) or “asymmetric paternalism” 
(camerer et al., 2003) movements. But its neurobiological and evolu-
tionary anchoring seems to plead for an adaptation of institutions to 
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that bias rather than for an attempt at eliminating it through adequate 
institutional design. 
Measures that could be considered include the creation of indexed units 
of account, as in the chilean example, of markets to hedge inflation risk, 
such as the European inflation futures market at the chicago Mercantile 
Exchange (hIcP<<the abbreViation for the chicago 
MercantiLe exchange is cMe / what is hicp for? 
harMonised index of consuMer prices? if so, not 
sure how that wording fits here / possibLe to 
cLarify?>>), as recommended by Shiller, or of mandatory revalua-
tion measures, such as those that cover rents or child support payments 
in some countries. Education can also play a role, as some surveys show 
that economists do not suffer from money illusion (Shiller et al., 1997), 
which attests to the impact of learning on this issue. 
In the meantime, the real effects of money illusion should not be ignored 
since a large number of financial transactions or contracts are denomi-
nated and exchanged in money terms but not indexed to prices, as well 
as the presentation of company accounts, determining corporate income 
tax or financing decisions, and because even a low level of money illu-
sion appears to have a significant impact on agents’ choices (akerlof and 
Yellen, 1985; Fehr and Tyran, 2001, 2007). By testing these effects and 
taking them into account in models, we would be able to better understand 
and assess price and wage stickiness, speculative bubbles on real estate 
or financial markets, and real effects of nominal shocks. 
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